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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The ruling authorizing deferred compensation plans will be
appreciated by business. It is hoped that the plans adopted will be
bona fide arrangements to provide benefits on retirement, death, or
disability.
THE PROBLEM OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS AND DEPARTMENTAL TRIALS
Both the federal and New York jurisdictions agree that the
findings of fact made by a quasi-judicial administrative board are
subject to judicial scrutiny in that the reviewing court must deter-
mine whether the facts found are supported in the record by "sub-
stantial evidence." The concept of substantial evidence, referred to
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as an "undefined defining" 1 term, is of
necessity and of legislative design an elastic one. After a preliminary
consideration of the general scope of the substantial evidence rule,
this note will concern itself with the extent to which this elastic con-
cept of review encompasses an examination of the credibility of the
witnesses before the board.
The Federal Concept
The federal statute generally determinative of the scope of judi-
cial review of administrative findings of fact is Section 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act.2 This section reads in pertinent part:
Except so far as as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion-
(e) Scope of Review.... [T]he reviewing court shall ... (B) hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... (5)
unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements
2 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 747, 489 (1951).
260 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) 1958). In rare instances,
judicial review of an administrative finding of fact includes a determination
de novo of the disputed fact. For cases involving a "jurisdictional" fact,
where the Supreme Court held that protection of a constitutional right neces-
sitated court determination of the facts, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22(1932) (whether, in a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, the injury occurred upon the navigable waters of the
United States and whether the relationship of master and servant existed in
the maritime employment); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)
(whether a person under order of deportation is a citizen).
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of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute. ... In making the foregoing determinations the court
shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by
any party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
The rule of substantial evidence remains uniform in the federal
area,3 for the regulatory statutes which, in establishing a quasi-
judicial procedure for a particular agency and in providing for judi-
cial review of substantial evidence, have an "identity of aim" with
the Administrative Procedure Act regarding the proof which must
support a decision.4
It is well to notice at this early point that "substantiality" is
the sole ordeal which the evidence adduced before the board need
survive. There is no statutory requirement, nor has decisional law
demanded,6 that any or all of the evidence be of a kind that would
be admissible before the courts, so long as the respondent before the
board has received a hearing which was adequate and fair.7
Of dubious assistance in pinning down the elusive concept of
that evidence which is substantial are the numerous decisions de-
voted to a review of the particular evidence and an adjudgment
whether it is substantial. The Supreme Court, however, has spoken
in a conceptual vein, delineating in so far as it felt was possible the
nature and scope of substantial evidence. A leading decision is
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,s in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter
crystallized the judicial attitude which prevails today.
In part, the Universal Camera case held that the statutory
phrases "as considered on the record as a whole" 9 and the "whole
record" 10 mandate the reviewing court to scrutinize the evidence
which supports the administrative finding in the light of whatever
opposing evidence "fairly detracts from its weight." " This holding
3 See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951) (review
of findings made under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 192 F2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1951)(review of findings made by the Civil Aeronautics Board) ; Ellers v. Railroad
Retirement Bd., 132 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1943) (review of findings made under
the Railroad Retirement Act).4 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 1.
s See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 482-83 n.15.6 Ellers v. Railroad Retirement Bd., sipra note 3; International Ass'n
of Machinists v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd, 311 U.S. 72
(1940).
7 See ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913).
8340 U.S. 474 (1951).
961 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958). This section of the
Taft-Hartley Act provides for review of orders of the National Labor Re-
lations Board. "The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact
if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall
be conclusive." Ibid.
1060 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1952). For the full wording
see text following note 2 supra.
"
1 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
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was elicited by a desire to dispel a view considered too prevalent,
i.e., substantial evidence existed when the record yielded any evidence
in support of the board's determination.' 2 Concerning the nature
of that evidence which thereafter was to be subjected to the debilitat-
ing effects of opposing testimony, the Court reaffirmed the definition
of substantial evidence pronounced in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 13 where it was said that "substantial evidence is more than
a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 14
The Court seemed to find that a further particularization of
substantial evidence would be unfruitful. Characterizations such as
"the intractability of any formula to furnish definiteness of content
for all the impalpable factors involved in judicial review," 15 "a mood
• . . [which] can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as
a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application," 16 and
"a standard leaving an unavoidable margin for individual judg-
ment," 17 result, as Professor Jaffe points out, in an appeal to the
judicial conscience.' 8
The New York Concept
It should first be observed that the New York certiorari statute, 19
Section 1296 of the Civil Practice Act, poses two standards for the
evidence upon which a finding must be based in a hearing required
by statute. Quantitatively, that evidence must be substantial; quali-
tatively, that evidence must, at least in part, be legally competent.
The qualitative sine qua non of the supporting evidence is a
"legal residuum." Original enunciation of the idea that the accept-
ability to a reviewing court of evidence supporting an administrative
finding depends upon its correspondence, at least in minimal part,
with the quality of evidence admissible in a court of law, was made
12 Id. at 477-78. Professor Jaffe of Harvard illustrates the then-existing
confusion about the scope of review when he points out that in the Universal
Camera case the government argued that review had always been on the record
as a whole, while the Court in holding that the record must be so considered
asserted that the law has been changed. Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial
Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HARV. L. Rtv. 1233-36 (1951).
1305 U.S. 197 (1938).
'4 Id. at 229.
15 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
16 Id. at 487.
17 Id. at 489.
1s Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,"
64 HARV. L. REv. 1233, 1239 (1951).
19 Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act abolishes, among other common-law
prerogative writs, the writ of certiorari, and establishes in their stead an ex-
clusive statutory proceeding against a body or an officer. N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
AcT § 1283. This statute, while effecting a procedural change, did not alter
[ VOL. 34
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in Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 20 Although reviewed by way of
appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Law, the Carroll deci-
sion, which reversed the Board's finding because the only evidence
probative of that finding was hearsay, became the accepted interpre-
tation of the certiorari statute.21  Section 1296(6) embodies the
Carroll doctrine in its provision that one question determinable in
an article 78 proceeding in the nature of certiorari is "whether there
was any competent proof of all the facts necessary to be proved in
order to authorize the making of the determination." 22
Undoubtedly the Carroll doctrine of "legal residuum" has been
weakened. It has on occasion been ignored, 23 distinguished, 24 and
held inapplicable.2 5 Perhaps the most that can be said is that both
the statute and the rule, though long unwielded, remain at the judi-
cial fingertips for application to a particularly flimsy administrative
finding which outrages the reviewing court. Resort to the legal
residuum rule in such an instance is improbable, however, since the
other standard for reviewing the probative basis of an administrative
order, the substantial evidence test, is both the current avenue of
review and an adequate challenge to the validity of an unfounded
order. There is distinguished support for the view that it would be
preferable to have a single standard, that of substantial evidence,
excluding from the present dichotomy the requirement of a residuum
of legally competent evidence. In this manner administrative agencies
could enter orders, otherwise sustainable, where no technically com-
petent evidence is available on some fact in issue and where, tech-
nically incompetent evidence alone is available, that evidence is com-
pletely convincing.26  It may be that judicial lip service to the ex-
istence of the legal residuum rule in cases where the basis of decision
is the substantial evidence test indicates that this single standard has
in fact been accomplished by an absorption of the independent exist-
ence of a legal residuum requirement into the elastic area of sub-
stantial evidence. Thereby the quality of the evidence is but one
the substantive elements of the writ of certiorari. Newbrand v. City of
Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 33 N.E.2d 75 (1941).
20218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E.2d 504 (1916).
21 1 BENJAzfIN, ADMINIsTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YoRK 184 (1942).2 2 1d. at 182-83.
23 Id. at 186-87, citing Heaney v. McGoldrick, 286 N.Y. 38, 35 N.E.2d 641
(1941) (basis of finding was an official report of investigation, technically
incompetent as hearsay); Roge v. Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268, 20 N.E.2d 751
(1939) (basis of finding was an inference from equivocal facts).
24AItschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 46 N.E.2d 886 (1943); Beckley
v. Pyrke, 218 App. Div. 352, 218 N.Y. Supp. 329 (4th Dep't 1926) (per curiam).2 5 Doca v. Federal Stevedoring Co., 308 N.Y. 44, 123 N.E.2d 632 (1954);
Kopec v. Buffalo Brake Beam-Acme Steel & Malleable Iron Works, 304 N.Y.
65, 106 N.E.2d 12 (1952).
26 1 BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 190 (1942).
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subsidiary factor in determining the presence of evidence which
reasonably supports a finding.
What the Universal Camera 27 case is to the federal area, Stork
Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland 28 is to the New York law of substantial
evidence review. After a hearing in which the State Labor Relations
Board found that the Stork Club was dominating a "company union"
and had fired nine waiters for engaging in union activity, the Board
entered an order that the restaurant cease these unfair labor prac-
tices. The statute providing for the scope of review of State Labor
Relations Board orders states that "the findings of the board as to
the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." 29 Speaking
for a unanimous court in upholding the Board's order, Chief Judge
Lehman held that a finding is supported by the evidence only when
the evidence is so substantial that from it an inference of the existence
of the fact found may be drawn reasonably. That the whole record
of the hearing be considered is necessary because "evidence which
unexplained might be conclusive may lose all probative force when
supplemented and explained by other testimony." 3 0
In addition to Section 707 of the Labor Law, the many New
York statutes which create administrative agencies and provide for
review of the agencies' quasi-judicial order, either directly or by ref-
erence to an article 78 proceeding, are interpreted to require sub-
stantial evidence as the criterion for review of the findings of fact.3'
27 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See text fol-
lowing note 8 supra.
2 282 N.Y. 256, 26 N.E.2d 247 (1940).29 N.Y. L.oam LAW § 707(2). The authority for judicial review is found
in § 707(4) of the Labor Law.
30 Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 274, 26 N.E.2d 247, 255
(1940).
31 Section 624 of the Labor Law, part of the Unemployment Insurance Law,
gives to a party aggrieved by an order of the appeal board the right to appeal
to the Appellate Division, Third Department, on questions of law. The scope of
appeal is defined in § 623 of that law: "A decision of the appeal board
shall be final on all questions of fact and, unless appealed from, shall be final
on all questions of law." This provision has been held to mean that the
determination of the appeal board, if szstained by substantial evidence, is con-
clusive upon the courts. Matter of Cassaretakis, 289 N.Y. 119, 44 N.E.2d
391 (1932), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Standard Dredging Corp. v.
Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943).
Section 23 of the Workmen's Compensation Law authorizes an appeal to
the Appellate Division, Third Department, from an order of the Board. Section
20 provides that "the decision of the board shall be final as to all questions
of fact." The statutory "finality" means "final" only when the questions of
fact are supported by substantial evidence. See McCormack v. National City
Bank, 303 N.Y. 5, 99 N.E.2d 887 (1951).
The following sections of the Education Law authorize an Article 78
proceeding to review a determination of the Board of Regents revoking, sus-
pending, or annulling the license of a professional person: § 6515(5) (physi-
cian) ; §6613(5) (dentist) ; § 6911(4) (nurse) ; §7011(5) (podiatrist);
§ 7406(6) (certified public accountant). Section 22 of the Civil Service Law
provides for Article 78 review of a removal from a civil service position, and
Telescoping all the instances where an administrative hearing is re-
quired by statute, Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, specifically
subdivision 7 of section 1296, empowers the Appellate Division to
reverse a finding of the board when there is "such a preponderance
of proof against the existence of any of those facts that the verdict
of a jury, affirming the existence thereof, . .. would be set aside by
the court as against the weight of evidence." The Court of Appeals
narrowed the scope of this review explicitly, after indications to that
effect, 32 when it held in Weber v. Town of Cheektowaga 3 3 that there
was not a sufficiently substantial quantum of evidence to sustain the
quasi-judicial finding of fact only when a jury verdict founded on
that evidence would necessarily be set aside as against the weight of
evidence. Although the statute makes a jury-verdict analogy, in
reviewing under the authority of section 1296 the courts speak almost
exclusively in the idiom of "substantial evidence." 4
The Issue of Credibility
The substantial evidence rule does not contemplate a reversal
of the agency's finding of fact merely because the inference drawn
by the agency is not the inference the reviewing court itself would
have drawn. In the words of the Universal Camera case, a court
may not "displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting
views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different
'choice had the matter been before it de novo." 3 5  The Stork Restau-
rant case propounds the same limitation thus: "Choice lies with the
§ 121 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law authorizes a like review for
-determinations of the State Liquor Authority refusing to issue a license
and revoking, cancelling, and suspending a license. For the substantial evi-
dence aspects of an article 78 proceeding to review, see text infra; Lynch's
Builders Restaurant, Inc. v. O'Connell, 303 N.Y. 408, 103 N.E.2d 531 (1952)
(per curiam) (State Liquor Authority hearing); Miller v. Kling, 291 N.Y.
65, 50 N.E.2d 546 (1943) (per curiam) (civil service hearing).
32 Prior to the Weber case, the Court of Appeals had at least twice re-
versed an order of the Appellate Division annulling a quasi-judicial deter-
mination of fact and reinstated the determination of the agency. Roge v.
Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268, 20 N.E.2d 751 (1939); People ex rel. Guiney v.
Valentine, 274 N.Y. 331, 8 N.E2d 880 (1937). Since the Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction only to review questions of law, with a few exceptions not
pertinent here, it must have considered that the Appellate Division was deciding
a question of law in annulling the administrative finding, i.e., whether a jury
verdict would be set aside as a matter of law. 1 BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIvE
ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE oF NEW YoRx 331-32 (1942).
33284 N.Y. 377, 31 N.E.2d 495 (1940).
34 See, e.g., Lynch's Builders Restaurant, Inc. v. O'Connell, supra note 31;
Avon Bar & Grill, Inc. v. O'Connell, 301 N.Y. 150, 93 N.E.2d 573 (1950);
Burke v. Bromberger, 300 N.Y. 248, 90 N.E.2d 61 (1949); Miller v. Kling,
supra note 31; Murphy v. Valentine, 284 N.Y. 524, 32 N.E.2d 537 (1940);
Weber v. Towm of Cheektowaga, 284 N.Y. 377, 31 N.E.2d 495 (1940).
35 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
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Board and its finding is supported by the evidence and is conclusive
where others might reasonably make the same choice." 36 Thus the
reviewing court must take into consideration the opposing inferences
in the entire record in questioning the rationality of the factual in-
ference actually drawn from the evidence, but never either weigh
that evidence nor indulge in personal inference-drawing. It is small
wonder that Professor Jaffe remarks that this distinction "requires
subtle, disciplined intellectual discrimination." 37
Lurking in the background of any evaluation of inferences is
the issue of credibility. The credibility of the testimony which gives
rise to an inference is an essential element in the validity of that
inference. How far, then, into the veracity and reliability of oral
testimony may the reviewing court inquire in testing the durability
of the inference finally drawn against the possible opposing inferences?
One answer, perhaps the strictly logical conclusion if the court
is to test the validity of inferences on a consideration of all the tes-
timony, is to open the question of credibility completely. Such an
approach, however, would- be neither acceptable to the courts nor
desirable. The New York courts, having held that "it is axiomatic
that where there is a conflict in the evidence as to the issues con-
troverted, matters of credibility and weight are for the jury to de-
termine or, if the trial be without a jury, for the trier of the facts," 38
also declare that it is for the administrative board alone to pass on
the veracity of opposing witnesses.3 9 Likewise, the federal courts
will not inquire into the credibility of witnesses before a court 40 or
administrative hearing.41
A modification on the approach that the reviewing court may
not question the credibility of witnesses at an administrative hearing
has been suggested in a few decisions involving the scope of sub-
stantial evidence, although never utilized as the basis of overturning
an order. In the federal area, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit introduced the idea that testimony which is incredible as a
matter of law could not be the foundation of the board's finding of
fact.42 Granting the NLRB's petition for enforcement of its order
over the employer's objection that the Board was biased in that it
uniformly credited its own witnesses and has uniformly discredited
his witnesses, the court wrote:
36 Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 274, 26 N.E.2d 247, 255
(1940).
7 Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1020, 1028(1956).
3 Kelly v. Watson Elevator Co., 309 N.Y. 49, 51, 127 N.E.2d 802, 803
(1955).
39 See Avon Bar & Grill, Inc. v. O'Connell, 301 N.Y. 150, 93 N.E.2d 573
(1950).
40 See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
41 See Eastern Coal Corp. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1949).
42 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 161 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1947).
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Unless the credited evidence . . . carries its own death wound, that is, is
incredible and therefore, cannot in law be credited, and the discredited evi-
dence . . . carries its own irrefutable truth, that is, is of such nature that it
cannot in law be discredited, we cannot determine that to credit the one and
discredit the other is an evidence of bias.43
The Supreme Court seized upon this language in NLRB v. Pitts-
burgh Steamship Co.,44 reversing a Court of Appeals decision that
the Board's findings and order were invalidated by the trial exam-
iner's bias as disclosed by his crediting the Board's witnesses and
discrediting witnesses for the employer. The Court held that the
findings were supported by substantial evidence as required by the
Wagner Act and that the trial examiner credited no testimony which
"carries its own death wound" nor discredited any which "carries
its own irrefutable truth." 45
In New York, there is an indication that testimony which is
"impossible or incredible" 46 will not constitute substantial evidence.
Reversing the Appellate Division's annulment of the determination
of the Chief Magistrate dismissing a court employee, the Court of
Appeals disagreed with the view that complainant's testimony was
"unsupported, confused, contradictory, and incredible." 47 Although
there were contradictions and confusion in the testimony, the court
held it was not impossible or incredible, and in refusing to give effect
to testimony not thus tainted, the Appellate Division erred in sub-
stituting its views on a question of fact.
Although refusal to surrender the evaluation of testimony com-
pletely to the agency is desirable, the above approach lacks subtlety.
It does not take into account the nature of the process which the
reviewing court undertakes, that of testing inference against infer-
ence; it looks only to excise from the sum total of evidence that
rare piece of testimony which is so unbelievable that it cries to heaven
for vengeance.
A third method of treating credibility 48 is premised on the propo-
sition that the judge must pass on the rationality of one inference
drawn from facts on the record which are susceptible of different
inferences. Testing the inference drawn against the opposite infer-
ences possible, the court considers as tending to vitiate the fact found
only that evidence of extrinsic circumstances which would tend to
lessen the probability of the existence of the fact found, and not that
testimony which denies the existence of the fact found. For example,
the National Labor Relations Board might have before it a charge
43 Id. at 800.
44337 U.S. 656 (1949).
NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 660 (1949).4 6 Burke v. Bromberger, 300 N.Y. 248, 250, 90 N.E.2d 61, 62 (1949).
47 Ibid.
48 See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1020,
1031-35 (1956).
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that an employer wrongfully discharged an employee because of the
employee's union activities. The employer introduces evidence that
the employee had seriously insulted a patron, and argues that the
proper inference is that the discharge was made for misconduct. If
the employee admits his misconduct but introduces evidence of the
employer's hostility to unionism, a finding that the discharge was for
the employee's union activities would be weakened in the eyes of the
reviewing court by the evidence of the admitted misconduct. If,
however, the employee denies the misconduct charged, thus creating
a direct contradiction in testimony, and introduces evidence of the
employer's hostility to unionism, a finding that the discharge was for
the employee's union activities would not be weakened by the em-
ployer's testimony of the employee's misconduct; the credibility of
the employer's testimony of misconduct has been rationally reduced
by the evidence of his hostility to labor organizations.
The proponent of this approach, Professor Jaffe, writes that
seldom if at all will credibility be a crucial factor in the review of
administrative orders.49 It is true that physical, extrinsic evidence
to rebut opposing evidence is the usual method of proof in labor dis-
putes, compensation claims, and the issuing of licenses. However,
while not appearing in the federal area, there is a class of cases in
New York State wherein credibility, the naked word of one man
against another, is often determinative of the outcome of an admin-
istrative adjudication. Specifically, these cases are reviews of ad-
ministrative trials at which a member of the police force is adjudged
guilty by the Commissioner of infractions, criminal in nature, of
departmental rules.
Departmental Trials
When a police officer is charged with committing a wrongful
act which is of its nature covert and shielded from the eyes of pos-
sible witnesses, e.g., accepting bribes, using his authority to extort,
failing to make an arrest, moral misconduct, the departmental trial
on such charges often resolves itself into an oral accusation by the
complainant, at times a disreputable person, and a denial by the
accused. How will an administrative adjudication of guilt, premised
on a resolution of the credibility of either the accuser or the accused,
be reviewed within the scope of the substantial evidence rule?
It seems that the New York courts, stitch by stitch, have to some
degree hemmed in the vague outer edges of the substantial evidence
rule when the question of credibility is so crucial in protecting the
integrity of the police force, the rights of one criminally accused, and
the reputation and livelihood of a civil servant. The approach utilized
is neither of those discussed above-a heavy-handed refusing to credit
49 Id. at 1035.
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an accusation which "carries its own death wound," nor the mech-
anistic pitting of uncontradicted inference against contradicted in-
ference. What appears to have happened is that the theory and
experience of the criminal law has been brought to bear upon that
quantum of evidence called substantial in order to insure its reli-
ability. In this approach, the dominant characteristic of substantial
evidence is its power to "command the judicial confidence." "
An early indication of the special treatment accorded the review
of departmental trials is seen in People ex rel. Kelly v. Waldo,51
where the Appellate Division granted on application of the relator-
policeman a writ of certiorari to the Police Commissioner. Although
the scope of review under the writ 52 was broader than the present
article 78 substantial evidence review, it is noteworthy that the court
held that relator was entitled to the presumption of innocence since
the act alleged, taking money from the occupant of a home he was
inspecting, was a misdemeanor. The court then spoke in the language
of corroboration, stating that the proof was not balanced evenly in
that there was no reason to credit the accuser's testimony.53  In
another certiorari proceeding, the Appellate Division reviewed a de-
termination of the Commissioner adjudging a police officer guilty of
making an arrest without sufficient evidence and of falsely reporting
the name of a person present at the arrest.54 The sole witness in
support of the charges was the person present at the arrest, a man
of "most unsavory reputation," whose credibility had been the sub-
ject of many decisions in the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals. The notorious mendacity of this informer appears to have
led the court to a holding that his testimony, in and of itself without
regard to impeaching circumstances, was incredible.
Since the advent of an article 78 proceeding in the nature of
certiorari, two leading cases evaluate the testimony of a complainant
in terms of substantial evidence. Viewing substantial evidence as
evidence which is entitled to carry conviction, the Appellate Division
50 Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 320, 118 N.E.2d 452, 455 (1954).
5' 161 App. Div. 731, 146 N.Y. Supp. 581 (2d Dep't 1914).
52 On certiorari to review the determination of the Police Commissioner
the reviewing court passed on whether the facts involved in the determination
were satisfactorily supported by the evidence so that the verdict of a jury
would not be set aside as against the weight of evidence. See People ex rel.
Flanagan v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 93 N.Y. 97 (1883). Certiorari under
§ 1304 of the Civil Practice Act contemplated the same review. See People
ex reL. Guiney v. Valentine, 274 N.Y. 331, 8 N.E.2d 880 (1937).
G3 Another case which seems to turn on the presumption of innocence is
People ex rel. Burke v. Waldo, 163 App. Div. 28, 147 N.Y. Supp. 1092 (2d
Dep't 1914). There the determination of the Police Commissioner was affirmed
only because the relator's veracity was impeached by his admissions that at a
prior investigation he had denied knowledge of the incident involved. Other-
wise, the court stated, it would be inclined to reverse.
54 Reger v. Mulrooney, 241 App. Div. 38, 271 N.Y. Supp. 20 (1st Dep't
1934).
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for the First Department held in DiNardo v. Monaghan 55 that the
principle of the criminal law which requires corroboration of the com-
plainant in a rape case is pertinent to an evaluation of the evidence
claimed to be sufficiently substantial to prevail against all reasonable
probabilities. The dismissal of petitioner from the police force on
the charge of rape was annulled because complainant's testimony,
considering the alleged place and time of the crime as well as the
lack of physical evidence concerning her person and clothing, was
incredible.
In Evans v. Monaghan,56 decided by the Court of Appeals in
1954, the DiNardo view that "the substantiality of evidence is re-
lated to the nature of the charge" 57 is apparently adopted, and the
same phenomenon of insinuating the spirit of a criminal law rule
into the corpus of substantial evidence is achieved. On findings made
at a hearing, the Police Commissioner dismissed five members of his
department for conspiring with Harry Gross to promote the business
of bookmaking. In the lower appellate court 58 the dismissals were
sustained on the grounds that Gross' testimony, on the credibility
of which "in the end all the specifications of the charges depend," 59
was not incredible as a matter of law and if believed was a reasonable
basis for a finding of fact. The dissent in the Appellate Division,
citing the Reger,60 Kelly,6' and DiNardo 62 decisions, felt that "the
basic reason for its salutary purpose [Section 399 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure] 63 should in fairness and justice be not lost
sight of in police trials upon charges involving criminality." 64 The
Court of Appeals, with Judge Van Voorhis speaking for a unanimous
court, affirmed the order of the Appellate Division sustaining the
dismissals.65 In so far as the present treatment of the credibility
problem is concerned, the importance of the highest court's affirma-
tion of the lower court order lies in its reliance upon the reasoning
of the dissent in the Appellate Division. Judge Van Voorhis wrote
55282 App. Div. 5, 121 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st Dep't 1953) (per curiam).
56306 N.Y. 312, 118 N.E.2d 452 (1954).
57 DiNardo v. Monaghan, mi-pra note 55, at 7, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
58 Evans v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 382, 123 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1st Dep't
1953).
59 Id. at 390, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
60 Reger v. Mulrooney, 241 App. Div. 38, 271 N.Y. Supp. 20 (1st Dep't
1934).
61 People ex rel. Kelly v. Waldo, 161 App. Div. 731, 146 N.Y. Supp. 581
(2d Dep't 1914).62 DiNardo v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 5, 121 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st Dep't
1953) (per curiam).
13 Section 399 reads: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of
an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to
connect the defendant with the commission of the crime."
64 Evans v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 382, 396, 123 N.Y.S.2d 662, 675
(1st Dep't 1953).
65 Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 118 N.E.2d 452 (1954).
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that the court has "not lost sight of the statement made by the dis-
senting justices at the Appellate Division" 66 which argues that the
reason for requiring corroboration of an accomplice's testimony at a
criminal trial should pervade a departmental trial on criminal charges.
Concerning the corroboration aspect of section 399, the Reger, Kelly,
and DiNardo cases, and those divorce cases involving the testimony
of private detectives and prostitutes, the court stated that "it is rele-
vant to what is required to ascribe veracity to the testimony of a
convicted professional gambler such as Harry Gross." 67 This cor-
roboration the court found to exist in various circumstances: the
magnitude of Gross' operations within the jurisdiction of the dis-
missed police officers and the lack of action taken by them; the
consistency, interior cohesion, and multiplicity of detail of the 450
page testimony given by a man of unsystematic mind; the failure of
the policemen to offer any rebutting evidence.
The Court of Appeals has not further discussed the corrobora-
tion requirement it imposed in the Evans case. It is probable, how-
ever, that the Evans rationale is responsible for that court's recent
reversal without opinion 68 of an Appellate Division order which
affirmed the Commissioner's dismissal of two police officers. 69 The
majority opinion in the Appellate Division, holding the dismissal
supported by substantial evidence, found the "internal confirmatory
facts" 70 required by Evans to be that the persons charging the police-
men with extorting money from them, although of "obvious anti-
police bias," 71 told essentially the same story and made an immediate
complaint; the dissent there concluded that the identification of the
petitioners, resting ultimately on the credibility of only one dis-
reputable informer, was not enough. It seems that the facts are
similar enough to those of the Evans case to conclude that the court
applied the Evans requirement of corroboration for the testimony
given by a person of dubious veracity, and found the corroborating
circumstances insubstantial.72
66 Id. at 319, 118 N.E.2d at 455.
67 Id. at 320, 118 N.E.2d at 455.6 8 La Forge v. Kennedy, 143 N.Y.L.J. 13, (1960) (memorandum opinion).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, counsel for the dismissed policemen strongly
urged the corroboration theory. See brief for Petitioners-Appellants, pp. 17-23.
69 La Forge v. Kennedy, 8 App. Div.2d 143, 186 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1st Dep't
1959).
70 Id. at 149, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
71 Id. at 148, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
72 In another recent memorandum decision, four judges of the Court of
Appeals concurred in affirming the Appellate Division's confirming of the
Police Commissioner's determination. The Chief Judge and another judge
voted to reverse upon the ground that the evidence did not meet the standard
prescribed by the Evans decision. Centner v. Monaghan, 7 N.Y.2d 877, 164
N.E.2d 874, 196 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1959).
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Conclusion
The cases discussed above are perhaps not so numerous as to
be collectively termed a trend. As an approach to the problem of
credibility, however, there is much to recommend a court review
which evinces an awareness of the problem and suggests guideposts
from other areas of judicial experience. Premising by case law a
requirement of corroboration drawn from the analogous principle of
the criminal law on the proposition that "the substantiality of the
evidence is related to the nature of the charge" 73 is surely justified
in the light of the consequences attending the dismissal of a policeman
on a criminal charge. Additional justification for restricting the
generality and elasticity of the substantial evidence rule is found in
the fact that the administrative expertise sought to be protected on
review is non-existent in departmental trials. That the issue of
credibility be singled out in this particular area of administrative
proceedings is likewise desirable, for the rationality of the inference
drawn from facts susceptible of different inferences is not easily tested
when both the accusation and the denial are perfectly consistent with
reason. Finally, it is desirable that an administrative adjudication
"of unusual importance to petitioners and to organized society" 74
be subject to a more pin-pointed definition of "substantial evidence,"
a formula whose patness ought not to dull the judicial sensitivity in
this significant area.
7 3 DiNardo v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 5, 7, 121 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121 (1st
Dep't 1953) (per curiam).
74Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 322, 118 N.E.2d 452, 456 (1954).
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